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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
COMPELLABILITY OF ONE SPOUSE TO TESTIFY
AGAINST THE OTHER IN CRIMINAL CASES'
By M. PETE MosEa*
I. INTRODUCTION
Can one spouse in a criminal case be forced to testify
against the other if the accused or the spouse called as a
witness against him objects? This problem has repeatedly
arisen in the Maryland Courts, particularly in assault cases.
Frequently a husband beats his wife, and the only witness
to the incident is the wife herself. When the wife is called
as a witness against her husband, she refuses to testify.
This article concerns only certain facets of the problem.
We shall first discuss the basic concepts of law that courts
follow in this type of case and mention some of the public
policy considerations upon which these concepts are based.
Next we shall develop the common law on compelling a
wife to give testimony against her husband in a criminal
prosecution for an offense of actual violence against her
person. Then the effect of Maryland statutes and case law
on the common law will be considered. Lastly we shall
discuss briefly the types of criminal cases in which one
spouse may be compellable to give testimony against the
other.'
Although the discussion will be in terms of a wife testi-
fying against her husband, the analysis and the rules de-
veloped would today also apply to a case in which a hus-
band is called as a witness against his wife.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1947, The Citadel; LL.B., 1950, Har-
vard Law School.
.The author, while accepting full responsibility for the conclusions and
opinions stated herein, wishes to thank Judge S. Ralph Warnken of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City for his advice in the preparation of
this Article.
2 This Article deals only with the rules compelling one spouse to testify
against the other in criminal cases. Section 1 of Article 35 of the 1951
Maryland Code clearly makes one spouse both competent and compellable
as a witness in a civil case wherein the other is a party in interest. See
Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462 (1881).
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II. LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Three separate and distinct rules of law based on dif-
ferent considerations of public policy have, through the
years, influenced courts in determining the competency or
compellability of a wife to testify against her husband in a
criminal proceeding wherein he is an accused.3 We shall
state the rules, indicate the more important policies on
which they are based, and determine the importance of each
rule to our general topic. The reasons which courts an-
nounce as a basis for exceptions to the rules will then be
discussed.
A. Confidential Communications. The first rule of law
is the doctrine of confidential communications, which is
based on the belief that the closeness of the marital rela-
tionship requires that one spouse not be permitted to dis-
close confidential communications made to him by the other
spouse during the marriage. This doctrine was first men-
tioned in Maryland statutory law in 1864.1 It operates to
prevent spouses from testifying to verbal statements made
by one to the other and does not apply to notorious facts,
such as that the parties are married, or to actions other than
verbal statements, even though the spouses are the only
'This Article does not treat the related doctrine, Lord Mansfield's Rule,
which prevents either spouse from bastardizing issue conceived and born
during the marriage. Under this rule, after non access of the husband is
proved by clear and convincing evidence, either spouse may testify to any
fact reflecting upon the legitimacy of such issue, except to non access of
the husband. See Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 AtI. 318 (1938) ;
Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319, 2 A. 2d 17 (1938) ; Hall v. State, 176 Md. 488,
5 A. 2d 916 (1939) ; Comment, The "Lord Mansfield Rule" as to "Bastardiz-
ing the Issue", 3 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1938).
' Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 109, Sec. 3, in part provided: "..., nor in any case,
civil or criminal, shall any husband be competent or compellable to dis-
close any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, nor
shall any wife be (RiC) compellable to disclose any communication made to
her by her husband during the marriage." In 1.876 this provision was re-
pealed by Chapter 357, Section 1, of the Maryland Laws of that year. From
1876 until 1888, no legislation covered the subject of confidential communi-
cations. Chapter 545, Section 1(3), of the 1888 Maryland Laws included
the following language, which appears in the 1951 Code in Section 4 of
Article 35,: "... ; but in no case, civil or criminal, shall any husband or
wife be competent to disclose any confidential communication made by the
one to the other during the marriage; . . .". For a detailed discussion of
the doctrine of confidential communications, see VIII WIOMORE, EVIDENCP
(3d ed. 1940), Secs. 2332-2341. A conflict of authorities exists whether this
doctrine is of common law or statutory origin. See Shenton v. Tyler (1939)
1 Ch. 620, an English Court of Appeal case subscribing to the latter view.
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persons present at the time of such actions.5 Therefore, the
doctrine of confidential communications has importance
to the problem of compellability of one spouse to testify
against the other accused of a crime only to the extent that
in such a case, upon proper objection, neither spouse may
testify to confidential verbal statements made by one to
the other.
B. Party-in-Interest Testimony. The second rule, which
was first stated by Lord Coke, may be called the doctrine
of party-in-interest testimony.' It was believed that if a
party to a law suit or an accused in a criminal case were
permitted to testify, he would tend to commit perjury in
order to win his case. Therefore, he was not a competent
witness. This reasoning also applied to the wife of a party-
in-interest or of an accused. An additional reason for pro-
hibiting the wife from testifying was based on the theory
that a married woman was the same person as her husband.
Being the same person as the party-in-interest or the ac-
cused, she could not testify for her husband, who could not
himself take the witness stand.7 This common law rule was
eliminated by the statute in Maryland as to civil cases in
1864 and as to criminal proceedings in 1888.' Today the
rule has been eliminated in most other jurisdictions.'
C. Anti-Marital Testimony. The third rule may be
called the privilege against anti-marital testimony, and is
based on the policy favoring the preservation of marriages.
5 See Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 112, 63 Atl. 317 (1906) - first wife
permitted to testify that she and her husband on trial for bigamy were
married; Hanon v. State, 63 Md. 123 (1885) - wife permitted ito relate the
circumstances of an assault upon her by her accused husband. See also
UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1935), Sec. 347, and cases there
cited; VIII WIOmoRE, op. cit., supra, n. 4, Sec. 2337.
0 II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940), Sec. 600.
II WIGMORE, ibid, Sec. 601.
8 Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 109, Sec. 1, now Md. Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 1;
Md. Laws 1888, Ch. 545, Sec. 1(3), now Md. Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 4.
9 See II WIGMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 6, Sec. 577; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW (1947) 80. In Funk v. United States,
290 U. S. 371 (1933), the common law rule of incompetency of one spouse
to testify for ithe other accused of a crime was overruled as to the Federal
Courts. The last vestige of the party-in-interest testimony rule appears in
statutes of most jurisdictions of the United States, and bars testimony of
parties to a case regarding transactions with a deceased or insane person,
when such testimony is offered against the personal representatives of the
deceased or insane person or 'the heirs, devisees, legatees, or distributees of
a deceased person. II WIGMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 6, Sec. 488, n. 2; Md.
Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 3.
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One spouse should not be compelled to testify against the
other, because this would tend to disrupt the marital rela-
tionship. This rule originated at the same time as the doc-
trine of party-in-interest testimony and grew with it as a
corrollary. °
To understand the privilege against anti-marital testi-
mony, we must first determine by whom the privilege may
be asserted in cases where it exists. Some courts have held
that the privilege may be asserted only by the witness-
spouse, and not by the accused." Other courts have held
that the accused spouse has the right to assert the privilege,
but that the witness does not.'2 Still other courts have held
that the privilege may be asserted by either the witness or
the accused spouse.13 Because a majority of the jurisdic-
tions which have ruled on this question, including Mary-
land, hold that the privilege may be asserted only by the
spouse who is called as a witness, we shall speak of it as
existing in the witness only.
D. Necessity. Appellate courts have held that the doc-
trine of party-in-interest testimony and the privilege
against anti-marital testimony are inapplicable at common
law in certain cases, and as a result, one spouse is com-
petent and compellable to testify against the other. As a
basis for such decisions courts cite the doctrine of neces-
sity, which springs from the duty of the public to protect
the person of a married woman from acts of violence or
wrongs committed against her by her husband, which
might, because of the relationship of the parties, go un-
punished were she not to testify against him. 4 Cases in-
voking the doctrine of necessity and holding that a wife
'O VIII WIoMORM, op. cit., supra, n. 4, See. 2227. For a thorough discussion
of this doctrine, see VIII WioMoRE, op. cit., 8upra, n. 4, Secs. 2227-2245.
"E.g., Raymond v. State, ex rel. Younklns, 195 Md. 126, 72 A. 2d 711
(1950).
"E.g., People v. Medina, 32 P. R. 140 (1923). The earliest English de-
cisions applying the anti-marital testimony doctrine apparently held that
the accused could object to his spouse's testimony against him. See Bent
v. Allot, Cary 94, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1580); Anonymous, 1 Brownlow &
Goldsborough 47 (1613).
"E.g., State v. Mageske, 119 Or. 312, 249 Pac. 364 (1926) ; United States
v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir., 1943).
"E.g., Bentley v. Cooke, 3 Doug. 422, 99 Eng. Rep. 729 (1784); Hanon
v. State, 3 Md. 123 (1885) ; Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 53, 10 So. 427 (1892).
See also VIII WIGMORE, Op. cit., supra, n. 4, See. 2239.
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is competent to testify against her husband were decided
about the time of origin of the party-in-interest and anti-
marital testimony rules.
III. THE CommoN LAw
The common law making one spouse competent or com-
pellable to testify against the other in certain types of crimi-
nal cases has developed with confusion of the rules we have
just discussed. The basic rule is stated by Hochheimer to
be that:
"The . . .defendants and the husband or wife of
any of them are, at common law, incompetent to
testify... (but) the wife is a competent witness against
her husband, only when he is charged with an offense
of actual violence against her person, committed dur-
ing marriage, and is then compellable to testify."'5
This represents a combined statement of the party-in-
interest and anti-spousal testimony doctrines with the ex-
ception to both rules, which we have noted was based upon
the necessity of protecting the wife from bodily harm in-
flicted upon her by her husband." Let us now consider the
last phrase of the exception as stated by Hochheimer, that
the wife is compellable, as well as competent, to testify
against her husband accused of an offense of actual violence
against her person. In our discussion of this topic we shall
analyze first the cases holding that the wife is compellable
to testify against her husband, and then the single case
which holds that the wife is not compellable.
A. Cases Holding the Wife Compellable. As authority
for his statement that in certain cases the wife is com-
pellable to testify against her husband, Hochheimer cites
Johnson v. State.7 Here a wife refused to testify against
her husband accused of assaulting her, unless the court
15Hoc InHnIMER, CRIMES AND CRIMINAL -PROCEDURE (2d ed., 1904) 198, 199.
Contra: GoRTER, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1924) 210-211, citing Richardson v. State,
103 Md. 112, 63 Atl. 317 (1906). Parentheses added.
16 The first reported case recognizing the exception where force or violence
is exercised by a husband against his wife is Lord Andley's Trial, 3 How. St.
Tr. 401 (1631). A wife was permitted to testify against her husband
accused of committing rape upon her by directing his servants in the attack.
The wife was a willing witness at the trial.
17 94 Ala. 53, 10 So. 427 (1892).
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compelled her to do so. Although she did not initiate the
complaint or testify before the committing magistrate or
the grand jury, the action of the trial judge compelling her
to testify to the circumstances of the assault was upheld on
appeal. The Supreme Court of Alabama says:
"We do not think there can be any doubt of the
power of the court to compel her to testify. She is
made competent for her own protection, not as an in-
dividual simply, but as an individual member of
society; and that society - the public - has interest
in her testimony, to the end that crime may be pun-
ished, which is distinct from any purely personal right
of hers, and which she cannot waive. Upon considera-
tions of this character, the law has come to be well
settled in recognized texts and by adjudications of
courts of high standing that the wife is not only com-
petent in such cases, but is compelled, to testify."'"
The Johnson case has been cited with approval in sev-
eral later Alabama cases.19 However, in 1915, Alabama
I1 Ibid, 427-428.
"Williams v. State, 149 Ala. 4, 43 So. 720 (1907) - husband who was a
willing witness said to be both competent and compellable to testify against
his wife accused of assaulting him with intent to murder; McGee v. State,
4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912) - over objection of defendant, wife per-
mitted to testify against husband charged with assaulting her with intent
to murder; Court states that had wife not wished to testify, she could have
been compelled to do so. As authority for its holding, the Court in the
Johnson case, supra, n. 17, quotes from volume 7 of the American and
English Encyclopedia of Law (1st ed. 1889), 102, as follows: ". . . in any
criminal proceeding against a husband or wife for any bodily injury or
violence inflicted upon his or her wife or husband, such wife or husband is
competent and compellable to testify." The Court also cites the following
cases: Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351 (1882) - wife compelled over her
objection to testify against her husband accused of assault upon her;
Dumas v. State, 14 Tex. Cr. App. 464 (1883) - wife compelled to testify
for her husband accused of bigamy (based upon provision now in Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. (1941), Tit. 8, Art. 714, 2 Vernon's Tex. Stat. (1948),
" ..The husband and wife may, in all criminal actions, be witnesses for
each other; but they shall in no case testify against each other except in a
criminal prosecution for an offense committed by one against the other."] ;
Bramlette v. State, 21 Tex. Cr. App. 611, 2 S. W. 765 (1886) - wife com-
pelled to testify against husband accused of assault to murder her (based
upon the Texas statutory provision quoted above). None of these cases
has been overruled. In a later Texas case, Calloway v. State, 92 Tex. Cr.
App. 506, 244 S. W. 549 (1922), where a husband was charged with murder-
ing his wife, a letter she had written was held to have been properly
admitted in evidence against him on the theory of the Turner, Dumas and
Bramlette cases. The Calloway case reaffirms the view that under the
Texas statute the wife is compellable in cases where an offense is com-
mitted against her. See also State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 230 S. W. 2d 845
(1950), decided under a statute providing; in part: "No person shall be
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passed a statute providing that one spouse cannot be com-
pelled to testify for or against the other.20 After this, the
cases so hold, but indicate that the Johnson case states the
common law rule, which the statute changed.2 '
The rule in England is stated in the Court of Appeal
case of Rex v. Lapworth,22 in which a wife was compelled
over her objection to testify against her husband accused
of assaulting her. The Court says:
"There is no doubt that at common law the hus-
band or wife was always a competent witness in such
a case, and by the very nature of things it must have
been so, for otherwise, where the assault was com-
mitted in secret by one spouse upon the other, there
would be no means of proving it. Whatever the reason,
we are satisfied that at common law the wife was
always a competent witness for the prosecution when
the charge against her husband was one of having as-
sulted her. Once it is established that she is a com-
petent witness, it follows that she is a compellable
witness; that is to say that she, having made her com-
plaint of, or independent evidence having been given
of, an assault on her by her husband, and she having
incompetent to testify as a witness in any criminal cause or prosecution
by reason of being . . . the husband or wife of the accused, . . . Provided,
that no person on trial or examination, nor the wife or husband of such
person, shall be required to testify, but any such person may, at the option
of the defendant, testify in his behalf, . . ." (Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949), Sec.
546.260, formerly Sec. 4081). The Court in the Dunbar case reviews the
Alabama decisions, noting that the Alabama statute (infra, n. 20), changed
the common law rule of compellability, then follows the decision In DeBar-
deleben v. State, 16 Ala. App. 367, 77 So. 979 (1918), infra, n. 21.
2ONow Ala. Code (1940), Tit. 15, Sec. 311, providing: "The husband and
wife may testify either for or against each other in criminal cases, but
shall not be compelled so to do."
21 DeBardeleben v. State, 16 Ala. App. 367, 77 So. 979 (1918), which held,
pursuant to the statute (supra, n. 20), that if either the husband or wife
objects, It is reversible error to compel a wife to testify against her hus-
band accused of statutory burning. See also McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466,
129 So. 21 (1930) ; Taylor v. State, 25 Ala. App. 408, 147 So. 647 (1933) ;
Jordan v. State, 30 Ala. App. 313, 5 So. 2d 110 (1941). In Wyatt v. State,
35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950), the wife was called to testify against
her husband accused of rape of their fourteen year old daughter, and was
advised before the jury that she did not have 'to testify, if she did not wish
to. She refused to testify, as the State knew she would, and the Trial
Judge permitted the State to prove what she had testified at a former
hearing regarding her husband's relations with their daughter. The Court
said that the Defendant could not object to ithe advice to the wife before thejury, and held that testimony given at the former trial was properly
admitted.
(1931) 1 K. B. 117. Cf. Rex v. Leach, (1912) A. C. 305, 81 L. J. K. B.
616.
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been summoned, as she may be, she is, like all other
witnesses, bound to answer any questions put to her.
In other words, she becomes a compellable witness."2
B. Cases Holding the Wife Not Compellable. Only one
case was found holding that at common law one spouse is
not compellable to testify against the other accused of an
offense of actual violence against his person. In Rex v.
Phillips,24 a single judge of the Supreme Court of South
Australia sitting as a trial judge ruled that where a wife
is charged with wounding her husband with intent to
murder him, he is competent, but not compellable, to testify
against her. Upon defendant's objection, the trial judge
advised the husband that he did not have to testify against
his wife, if he did not wish to do so. This result was reached
after consideration of the common law cases holding that
a wife is incompetent to testify against her husband ac-
cused of an offense other than one of violence against her.
The case is contrary to the weight of authority and devoid
of consideration because of the public policy involved in
this type of situation.
C. Summary. The reasoning of courts which have de-
clared that a wife is compellable to testify against her hus-
band accused of an offense of actual violence against her
person follows two different lines of thought. The result
in the Johnson" case is based upon the interest of the
public in the injured spouse's well-being. The result in the
Lapworth26 case is reasoned from the premise that a wife
is competent to testify against her husband accused of as-
saulting her. The wife, being competent, has the same
rights, privileges, and duties as does an ordinary witness.
28Ibid, 121. See Comment, Compellability of One Spouse a8 a Witne88
against the Other Spou8e -in a Criminal Prosecution, 9 Can. B. Rev. 216
(1931), approving the decision in the Lapworth case. Compare the analysis
of the case in the following Notes, Compellability of Hu8band and Wife as
Witnesses against one another in Criminal Ca8e8, 94 Just. P. 691 (1930) ;
Compellability of Spouse to give Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 4 Aust.
L. J. 329 and 360 (1931).
s, (1922) S. A. S. R. 276. See also Riddle v. The King, 12 C. L. R. (Aust.)
622 (1911). - dictum that at common law the wife was not a compellable
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It follows that in such a case she is compellable to testify
either for or against her accused husband, just as is any
other witness. The holding in these cases, by whichever
line of thought it is reached, represents the rule that has
always been the common law.
IV. MARYLAND LAW
Having determined that at common law a wife is com-
pellable to testify against her husband accused of an offense
of actual violence against her person, we shall now see
whether Maryland statutes or cases change this rule. Two
provisions of the Maryland Code are pertinent to a dis-
cussion of this question. The provision which was first
enacted is now Article 35, Section 1 of the 1951 Code. The
second provision now appears in Article 35, Section 4 of the
1951 Code. We shall discuss these statutory provisions with
cases that construe them, in the order in which the statutes
were enacted.
A. Section 1 of Article 35. Section 1 of Article 35, un-
changed since first enacted in 1864, removes the incapacity
of a person as a witness in any civil or criminal case because
of crime (except perjury) or interest in the proceedings.2 T
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 1. As originally enacted, Md. Laws 1864,
Ch. 109, Sec. 1, provided:
"No person offered as a witness shall hereafter be excluded by reason
of incapacity from crime or interest, from giving evidence, either in
person or by deposition, according to the practice of the courts, in the
trial of any issue joined or hereafter to be joined, or of any matter
or question, or on any inquiry arising in any suit, action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, in any court, or before any Judge, Jury, Justice of
Peace or other person having, by law or by consent of parties, authority
to hear, receive and examine evidence; but that every person so offered
may and shall be admitted to give evidence, notwithstanding that such
person may or shall have an interest in the matter in question, or In
the event of the trial of any issue, matter, question or inquiry, or of
the suit, action or proceeding in which he is offering (sic) as a witness,
and notwithstanding that such person offered as a witness may have
been previously convicted of any crime or offence; but no person who
has been convicted of the crime of perjury shall be admitted to testify
in any case or proceeding whatever, and the parties litigant and all
persons in whose behalf any suit, action or other proceeding may be
brought or defended, themselves and their wives and husbands shall
be competent and compellable to give evidence in the same manner as
other witnesses, except as hereinafter excepted."
Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 109, Sec. 3, provided in part:
"..., nor, in any criminal proceeding, shall any husband be competent
or compellable to give evidence for or against his wife, nor shall any
wife be competent or compellable to give evidence for or against her
husband, except as now allowed by law .. .
Section 3 was repealed by Md. Laws 1876, Ch. 357, Sec. 1.
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The last clause of this Section reads as follows:
"... and the parties litigant and all persons in whose
behalf any suit, action or other proceeding may be
brought or defended, themselves, and their wives and
husbands shal (sic) be competent and compellable to
give evidence in the same manner as other witnesses,
except as hereinafter excepted."28
The quoted language at first glance seems clearly to
make both competent and compellable a husband or wife
called to testify in any criminal proceeding. However, in
1881, a case was decided by the Court of Appeals which
held that Section 1 applied only to civil cases and not to
criminal prosecutions. This was Turpin v. State,29 wherein
a husband was charged with murdering a third person, and
his wife was called as a witness on his behalf, but was not
permitted to testify. The Court of Appeals upheld the
action of the trial judge, reasoning that if a wife were per-
mitted to testify for her husband in a case of this type,
".... it would follow that the wife of the accused would
not only be competent to testify in his behalf, but
would be compellable to testify against him - a con-
clusion which we would hesitate to adopt, unless com-
pelled by the plain meaning and intent of the
statutes."8
This case did not involve an offense of actual violence
against the person of the wife. Had the husband been ac-
cused of assault upon his wife, the result would have been
different, as is illustrated by Hanon v. State,31 decided four
years later. This case holds that a wife is competent to
testify to the fact of marriage and to the circumstances of
an assault upon her by her husband, charged under a
statute prescribing whipping as an additional punishment
for wife beating. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
2 Md. Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 1. (Italics supplied.)
*55 Md. 462 (1881).
WIbid, 477. The defense argued that the repeal of the provisions of Sec-
tion 3 of Chapter 109 of the 1864 Laws in 1876 (8upra, n. 27), made a wife
competent to testify for her husband In a criminal case. The Court refused
to adopt this reasoning, despite the broad language of Section 1 (supra,
n. 27), which ends, "except as hereinafter excepted". The repealed Section 3
obviously was intended by the Legislature as an exception to Section 1.
6.3 Md. 123 (1885).
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"The necessity of permitting the wife to testify
against her husband springs from the duty of protect-
ing her person from violence, and the impunity with
which from the privacy and close relations of married
life assaults upon her might otherwise be perpetrated.
In allowing her to testify, her disability of coverture
is as much removed as if she were a feme sole or a
stranger in the case, and she therefore has all the
capacity any other witness would have. This being so,
she is as competent to prove the marriage as any one
else would be. It is not a fact arising from the con-
fidential relations of the parties, but a fact in its very
nature notorious and public; and we perceive no rea-
son why she cannot supply the proof of this essential
link in the chain of facts necessary to be proved, as well
as show the aggrevated character of the assault." 2
Since the wife in this case is said to have all the capacity
as a witness that a stranger would have, it is possible that
had she been compelled to testify over her objection, the
Court would have held that the trial judge was correct in
forcing her to testify.
B. Section 4 of Article 35. Section 4 of Article 35 of the
1951 Maryland Code, unchanged since its reenactment in
1888, provides in part, "In all criminal proceedings the hus-
band or wife of the accused party shall be competent to
testify; ... "
In Richardson v. State,3 the Court of Appeals ruled that
the first wife could testify to the fact of marriage to her
husband, who was charged with bigamy with a second
woman. This statement appears in the opinion: "She was
a competent witness against the accused under Sec. 4, Art.
35, Code 1904, although she could not have been compelled
to testify."' 4 This last phrase is dictum, since the wife
testified voluntarily. It could be explained on the ground
that the Court believed that bigamy was not an offense of
violence against the wife within the common law excep-
tion to the privilege against anti-marital testimony. How-
ever, because no authority is cited for the proposition, it is
Ibid, 127.
103 Md. 112, 63 At. 317 (1906).
"Ibid, 117. (Italics supplied.)
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unlikely that the Court gave much attention to this lan-
guage. A more plausible explanation is that the phrase
was adopted from the brief submitted by the State, in which
it was conceded that the wife was not compellable." This
dictum should have little weight were the direct question
of compellability today presented to the Court of Appeals
for decision.
The only other Maryland case bearing even remotely on
the question of a wife's compellability to testify against
her husband accused of an offense of actual violence against
her person is Raymond v. State ex rel. Younkins,8 an
appeal from an order granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The defendant had been convicted by a magistrate of assault
upon his wife, who had testified against him without first
being advised that she did not have to do so. The Court of
Appeals reversed the order granting the writ, stating that
no fundamental right of the defendant had been violated
at the trial. If there was any right of the wife to be advised
that it was her free choice to testify or not, it was her right
alone and not that of the accused husband. The Court cites
as illustrative of this principle the right of a witness not to
incriminate himself, which is personal to the witness and
cannot be asserted by the accused against whom the wit-
ness is called. The question of whether a wife has a privi-
lege not to testify against her spouse accused of assaulting
her was expressly left undecided by the Court."
C. Summary. The Maryland cases, as we have seen,
do not decide whether a wife can be compelled to testify
against her husband accused of a crime of actual violence
against her person. The language of the Hanon" case tends
to support the conclusion that the wife in such a case has
all the capacity as a witness that a stranger would have,
and therefore is compellable to testify either for or against
her husband. However, in the Richardson"9 case the Court
of Appeals states that a wife is competent, but not com-
a 103 Records and Briefs, Pt. 2, Court of Appeals No. 112 (1906), Brief
of Appellee, p. 2.





pellable, to testify against her husband charged with
bigamy. The recent Younkins4° case leaves the question of
the wife's compellability in an assault case undecided.
The Maryland Code expressly provides that a husband
or wife may testify for or against his spouse accused in a
criminal proceeding. This applies whether or not the
offense charged is one of actual violence against the person
of the spouse called as a witness. One might argue that
this Code provision was intended by the Legislature to in-
clude all the law on the competency and compellability of
one spouse as a witness in a criminal proceeding involving
the other; that by excluding all mention of compellability,
the Legislature intended by implication to change the com-
mon law making one spouse compellable to testify against
the other in certain cases; and that as a result, one spouse
is not compellable to testify against the other in any crimi-
nal case. But this argument is contrary to a basic rule of
statutory construction, the presumption against implicit
alteration of existing law.4 The only logical interpretation
which can be placed upon the Maryland statutes, reading
Sections 1 and 4 of Article 35 together, is that they remove
the common law prohibition against party-in-interest testi-
mony in both civil and criminal cases, but do not in any
way govern the privilege against anti-marital testimony.
The Legislature, when it enacted these provisions, did not
intend to deal with the problem of compellability of one
spouse to testify against the other accused of an offense of
actual violence against the person of the spouse called as
a witness.
For the rule in Maryland, we must therefore refer to
the common law, which we have developed in the preced-
ing Section of this Article. At common law a wife can be
compelled to testify against her husband accused of an
offense of actual violence against her person.42
,0 Supra, n. 36.
MAxwEL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (10th ed., 1953), 81-86.
See supra, Section III, p. 20. Even if a later statute or Court of Appeals
decision changes this rule, the witness under certain circumstances may
be held to have waived his privilege against anti-marital testimony. If
he testifies against his wife before the committing magistrate or grand
jury, most courts hold that he Is compellable at the trial of the case, or that
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V. CONCLusilO
Because this common law rule of compellability speaks
in terms of an offense of actual violence against the wife's
person, we shall consider briefly the types of offenses in-
cluded in this phrase. It is clear that all types of assault
and battery upon the wife, as well as rape of the wife dur-
ing the marriage, are included. These crimes obviously in-
volve actual violence against the wife's person.
Modern courts in jurisdictions not having legislation
on this subject, have tended to broaden the application of
this rule in criminal cases where the question is whether
the wife can testify voluntarily against her husband. These
courts have held that at common law a wife is competent
to testify voluntarily against her husband charged with
bigamy," desertion and non-support,4 , incest,45 rape of an-
other woman, 6 and abortion performed during the mar-
riage.47 Although this trend is illustrated only by cases in-
volving voluntary testimony of the wife, it is submitted
that the reasoning of the courts in these cases also would
his former testimony may be introduced by the state. McCoy v. State,
221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930) ; Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So.
2d 837 (1950), 8upra, n. 21. Cf. People v. Chadwick, 4 Cal. App. 63, 87
Pac. 384 (1906) - testifying at former trial not a waiver of privilege not
to testify at a subsequent trial. Other cases hold that a waiver of the
privilege exists If the witness does not object before she testifies on direct
examination. E.g., State v. Tola, 222 N. C. 406, 23 S. E. 2d 321 (1942);
People v. Rios, 34 P. R. 519 (1925).41 Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836 (1901). See VIII WzMoa,
See. 2239, n. 19.
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 27, Sec. 99, authorizes the State's Attorney to
take evidence in desertion and non-support cases. If a witness summoned
to appear before the State's Attorney refuses to testify, the Criminal Court
may issue an order requiring such witness to give testimony. Although no
specific mention is made of compelling a wife to give evidence against her
husband, it is likely that this provision applies to her. The offense is one
involving direct harm to the wife, or in some cases, children, and in cases
where the Department of Public Welfare is contributing to her support or
to the support of her children, the public has a definite interest In the
proceedings. See also WIGMORB, ibid, Sec. 2239, n. 14.
4State v. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N. W. 539 (1916). Contra: Toth v.
State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N. W. 2d 899 (1942), noted, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 25
(1943).
"0Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929). Contra: Cargill
v. State, 25 Okla. Cr. Rep. 314, 220 Pac. 64 (1923).
47Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 231 S. W. 41 (1921). Contra:
Miller v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 575, 40 S. W. 313 (1897). See also VIII
WIOMonE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), See. 2239, n. 11.
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apply to compelling a wife to testify against her husband
accused of one of these crimes, if she refused to do so."
This trend toward broadening the common law of com-
pellability certainly is based upon a common sense ap-
proach to the problem. As Dean Wigmore puts it,
" if the promotion of marital peace, and the appre-
hension of marital dissension, are the ultimate ground
of the privilege, it is an overgenerous assumption that
the wife who has been beaten, poisoned, or deserted,
is still on such terms of delicate good feeling with her
spouse that her testimony must not be enforced lest
the irridescent halo of peace is dispelled by the breath
of disparaging testimony." '49
The interest of the public in prosecuting most cases of this
type far outweighs the public policy favoring the protection
of marriages.
However, a logical argument can be made that one
spouse should not be compelled to testify against the other
in a criminal prosecution of a minor nature involving just
the husband and wife. An example would be assault not
involving injury sufficient to require a doctor's care. No
one but the victim is bothered, and the more important
public policy would favor preservation of the marriage,
provided the parties are reconciled. A reconciliation is
likely if the wife, called as a witness for the prosecution,
expresses a desire not to testify and states that she is living
with her husband. But where a serious criminal offense is
charged, or one in which the public is concerned, one spouse
should be compellable to testify against the other, whether
or not the harm to the witness-spouse is actual violence or
some type of more indirect harm. Examples of such an
offense include aggravated assault and battery, rape and
attempted rape of the wife or of another, sodomy with an-
"See supra, Section III, p. 20. The exceptions at common law to the
party-in-interest testimony and anti-marital privilege rules had to be made
by a court at the same time for the spouse to be permitted to testify. There-
fore, if a spouse is competent to testify against his spouse at common law,
he would also be compellable. See Rex v. Lapworth, (1931) 1 K. B. 117, 121,
8upra, Sec. III, n. 22.
'9 VIII WIGMOan, op. cit., supra, n. 47, Sec. 2239, p. 252. Dean Wigmore's
views are criticized in a Note, Compellability of Husband and Wife as Wit-
ne88es against one another in Criminal Cases, 94 Just. P. 691 (1930).
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other, attempted murder of the wife, bigamy, incest, and
abortion. Legislation is needed to discriminate in this way
between minor and serious offenses. Such legislation would
be the most practical approach to the problem of compella-
bility of a wife to testify against her husband accused in a
criminal case. 0Until the Legislature acts to change the common law,
the Court of Appeals would probably adopt the common
law as to compellability if the question ever were pre-
sented directly to it for decision. Ample authority in other
jurisdictions now exists for Maryland trial judges to compel
a husband or wife to testify against the spouse accused of
an offense of actual violence against the other's person.
However, application of this rule of compellability ought
not be limited by such judges to offenses of actual violence.
It is submitted that one spouse should be compelled to
testify against the other accused in any criminal prosecu-
tion wherein the offense charged is a serious one involving
harm to the spouse called as a witness, whether or not that
harm is actual physical violence.
8 This is similar to the solution suggested by the Court in State v. Dunbar,
360 Mo. 788, 230 S. W. 2d 845, 849 (1950), where the wife of accused
charged with assaulting her was forced over her own and the accused's
objections to testify to the circumstances of the assault. In reversing the
conviction because of the Missouri statute (Mo. Rev. St. (1949), Sec.
546.260, formerly Sec. 4041), the Court says:
"We believe that the administration of justice would be aided by
permitting one spouse to testify against the other in any criminal case,
but that such testimony should not be compelled except as to charges
of a serious nature. Perhaps the dividing line should be between mis-
demeanors and felonies."
See also, A. L. I. MoDEL CoDE or Ev n~oE (1942), Rules 214-218, dealing
with privileged communications between husband and wife. This privilege
is not operative where a spouse is charged with a crime against the person,
property, or child of either spouse; a crime against a third person com-
mitted during the commission of a crime against the other spouse; bigamy
or adultery; or desertion of the other spouse or the child of either (Rule
216). The Model Code omits all mention of the privilege against the anti-
marital testimony or its equivalent, but concerns itself exclusively with
confidential communications, and strictly limits both the definition and
application of this doctrine.
